The Constitutionality of Rescue Fund Triggers in North Carolina\u27s Judicial Campaign Reform Act by Kay, Jason Bradley & Sawyer, Jack McDaniel
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Volume 2 | Issue 2 Article 3
3-1-2004
The Constitutionality of Rescue Fund Triggers in
North Carolina's Judicial Campaign Reform Act
Jason Bradley Kay
Jack McDaniel Sawyer
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in First Amendment
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jason B. Kay & Jack M. Sawyer, The Constitutionality of Rescue Fund Triggers in North Carolina's Judicial Campaign Reform Act, 2 First
Amend. L. Rev. 267 (2004).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr/vol2/iss2/3
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "RESCUE
FUND TRIGGERS" IN NORTH CAROLINA'S
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT
JASON BRADLEY KAY* & JACK MCDANIEL SAWYER**
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has long wrestled with the theoretical
implications of the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment to
its Constitution.' We laud its near-absolute protection of freedom
to speak against the majority swell.2 We loathe its imprimatur of
" Attorney, Burlington, North Carolina; J.D., University of North Carolina
School of Law, 2003.
** Attorney, Burlington, North Carolina; Former Member, Alamance County
(N.C.) Board of Elections; J.D., Regent University School of Law, 1998.
1. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 1:11, at 1-17 (1994) ("One can keep going round and round on the
original meaning of the First Amendment, but no clear, consistent vision of
what the framers meant by freedom of speech will ever emerge."); see also
ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941)
(discussing the history of the First Amendment).
2. Justice Brandeis noted the importance of maintaining political
freedom to speak against the majority in Whitney v. California.
Those who won our independence believed that the final
end of the State was to make men free to develop their
faculties, and that in its government the deliberative
forces should prevail over the arbitrary.... They believed
that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread
of political truth .... But they knew that order cannot be
secured merely through fear of punishment for its
infraction, that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope
and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity
to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
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unseemly or dangerous ideas.' Determining the meaning and scope
of the First Amendment often strikes at the heart of our national
and personal values.
In recent years, campaign finance reform has again stirred
us to clarify the ever-shifting boundaries of the First Amendment.
Proponents of campaign finance reform cite the problems of
corruption and unequal access to political office as an unassailable
impetus for restructuring our election financing system.4 Reformers
tell us the First Amendment is intended to promote representative
political debate-any tilt of the political balance toward the wealthy
demands a regulatory response in order to protect the common
remedies ....
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
3. Professor Harry Wellington implied that the "search for truth" theory
of the First Amendment must inevitably produce a First Amendment
jurisprudence that tolerates repugnant ideas.
In the long run, true ideas do tend to drive out false ones.
The problem is that the short run may be very long, that
one short run follows hard upon another, and that we may
become overwhelmed by the inexhaustible supply of
freshly minted, often very seductive, false ideas.... Truth
may win, and in the long run it may almost always win,
but millions of Jews were deliberately and systematically
murdered in a very short period of time....
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES 754
(1997) (quoting Harry Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J.
1105, 1130, 1132 (1979)); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25
(1971) (holding that the offense to public values was an insufficient basis upon
which to restrict speech).
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom [of
speech] may often appear to be only verbal tumult,
discord, and even offensive utterance.... That the air
may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this
sense not a sign of weakness but of strength. We cannot
lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a
trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful
abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values are
truly implicated.
Id.
4. See Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 563, 563-64 (1999).
voter and hence preserve the very essence of democracy."
Detractors of campaign reform argue the First Amendment
prohibits any so-called "reforms" that undercut constitutional
protections." Political speech, they say, is at the center of First
Amendment protection; it is the most cherished speech of a free
democracy. Placing limits on who may financially support what
political causes and ideas, and to what extent, chips away at the
very foundations of democracy-small encroachments ought to be
sharply rebuked.8
This debate about the nature of free speech in the context
of campaign finance reform provided the backdrop for North
Carolina's recent passage of the Judicial Campaign Reform Act
(the Act).' The Act requires, among other things, that election of
North Carolina appellate judges be nonpartisan and publicly
funded.'O Nestled within the public funding portion of the Act is a
provision allowing publicly funded candidates to receive "rescue
funds" when attacked by opposing parties." Rescue fund triggers
have received considerable attention by the courts, producing
opposing views as to their constitutionality under the First
Amendment. 2 This paper explores the free speech implications of
5. See, e.g., Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the
Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 273, 276-77 (1993) (arguing that
"poor or middle-class" citizens are denied equal access to the political system
by current campaign fundraising methods and thus have their representation
in democratic government diluted).
6. See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment
Needs No Reform: Protecting Liberty From Campaign Finance "Reformers",
51 CATH. U. L. REV. 785, 836-37 (2002).
7. See id.
8. B. Chad Bungard, You Can't Touch This: A Lesson To Legislators on
Political Speech, 1 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 13, 23-24 (2003) (discussing the
repeated failed attempts of legislators to regulate issue advocacy in the process
of passing campaign finance reform).
9. Judicial Campaign Reform Act, 2002 Sess. Laws 158 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-278.61-.71). The Act took effect for elections held in 2004
and thereafter. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.61 (2003).
10. Id.
11. See id. § 163-278.67.
12. See generally Kenneth N. Weine, Triggering The First Amendment:
Why Campaign Finance Systems That Include "Triggers" Are Constitutional,
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the Act's rescue fund provision and renders an opinion as to its
constitutionality.
Section II of the paper explains the function of the statute
and the policy interests relating to the rescue fund provision.
Section IlI analyzes the constitutional arguments commonly
advanced on both sides of the debate. In this section, the rescue
fund provision is examined as to whether it (1) burdens protected
speech, (2) is content-neutral or content-based, and (3) meets the
likely standard of judicial inquiry. Section IV concludes with an
opinion as to the constitutionality of the Act's rescue fund clause.
II. THE STATUTE
Underlying Policy and Goals
Prior to October 10, 2002, North Carolina campaign finance
reformers cited a budding two-fold crisis in the state's appellate
judicial election system: (1) judicial elections were being hijacked
by special interest money, thereby diminishing meaningful
influence of the ordinary voter and (2) the electorate was
increasingly concerned that judges would not issue fair and
impartial rulings but would instead decide legal disputes in favor of
the largest campaign contributors." Public confidence in an elected
24 J. LEGiS. 223 (1999) (discussing the legislation and judicial precedent
involving rescue fund triggers through 1998).
13. Citing an American Viewpoint poll, the North Carolina Center for
Voter Education noted:
The most disturbing result of the public opinion study is
that there is considerable cynicism about judicial
elections. More respondents (47%) believe that judicial
elections do not reflect the will of the average voter...
and 78% think that campaign contributions influence
judges' decisions "a great deal" or "some".... Fifty-eight
percent (58%) of those polled believe that [there] are two
systems of justice in North Carolina, one [for] the rich and
powerful and one for everyone else.
Statewide Survey Shows Deep Concern About Judicial Elections in North
Carolina, REFORM LETTER (N.C. Ctr. for Voter Educ.), Aug. 2002, at 1,
http://www.ncvotered.com/downloads/newsletter/ul2002.pdf [hereinafter
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judiciary was purported to be shaky and getting worse. The Justice
at Stake Campaign reported:
According to [a recent poll], 72 percent of
Americans are concerned that the impartiality
of judges is compromised by their need to raise
campaign money. Thirty-five percent of the
respondents said they were "extremely" or
"very" concerned .
In response to these startling statistics, a myriad of special
interest groups mounted a vigorous campaign to change the
system.1 Even the American Bar Association joined in the fray,
echoing the call for reformation of judicial selection methodsS 16
throughout the nation.
On October 10, 2002, North Carolina's Judicial Campaign
Reform Act was signed into law. 7 Originally touted as "a modest
Statewide Survey] (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
14. News Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, Poll: Confidence in Judiciary Eroded
by Jfidges' Need to Raise Campaign Money: New American Bar Association
President Calls for End to Political Battles over the Courts (Aug. 12, 2002) (on
file with the First Amendment Law Review).
15. See Governor Easley Signs Judicial Campaign Reform Act, REFORM
LETrER (N.C. Ctr. for Voter Educ.), Dec. 2002, at 1, 3,
http://www.ncvotered.com/downloads/newsletter/dec2002.pdf [hereinafter
Governor Easley] (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
The following were "key members" of the -broad coalition of groups and
individuals" organized by The N.C. Voters for Clean Elections: N.C. Center
for Voter Education, Democracy South, Common Cause, N.C. League of
Women Voters. Id. Other coalition members included: Business and
Professional Women of N.C., Covenant With North Carolina's Children,
NAACP of North Carolina, N.C. Association of Educators, N.C. Council of
Churches, N.C. PIRG, and the N.C. Conservation Council. Id.
16. Former American Bar Association president and Raleigh attorney
Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., placed the issue of judicial independence and judicial
election reform at the forefront of the ABA's agenda. Summer of Reform,
EYES ON JUSTICE (The Justice at Stake Campaign, Washington, D.C.), Sept.
12, 2002.
17. Governor Easley, supra note 15, at 3. The Act passed 57-54 in the
State House (the vote was largely along party lines, with 56 Democrats and I
Republican voting for the Act and 54 Republicans and no Democrat voting
against the Act) and 34-12 in the State Senate. See Jim Hightower, Free The
Judges, THE NATION, Nov. 25, 2002, at 8.
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step on the road toward broader campaign finance reform affecting
all statewide races.. ." in North Carolina," the Act provided for
nonpartisan election of state appellate court judges and granted
publicly generated campaign funding to candidates running for
those offices.'9 North Carolina became the second state to enact
public campaign funding legislation for appellate level judges," a
move called "the most sweeping judicial reform America has had in
years" by national media.1 Its passage was hailed by reformers as a
"significant victory for the people over the special interests," a
victory which would ultimately instill greater public confidence and
trust in the judicial system.22
The Rescue Funds Provision
The Act accomplished two basic objectives: (1) establishing
a nonpartisan judicial election scheme for the North Carolina Court
of Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court and (2)
providing a publicly financed campaign fund for qualifyingS 23
candidates in those elections. Of particular concern in this paper
is the public campaign funding provision.
The public funding provision requires candidates for state-
wide judicial office14 to meet certain criteria in order to be
18. Better For The Bench, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 10,
2001, at A8 (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. See Judicial Reform Is Historic Step, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro,
N.C.), Sept. 28, 2002, at A12.
21. See Hightower, supra note 17, at 8.
22. Governor Easley, supra note 15, at 1. Governor Mike Easley stated:
Many a time I can recall the trial judge saying to the jury
'you have no friends to reward, you have no enemies to
punish, yours is but to seek the truth.' This bill goes a
long way toward making certain that there is no
impediment to that anywhere in a court system that we
believe has the most integrity in the nation, and we want
to keep it that way.
Id.
23. Judicial Campaign Reform Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-278.61 (2003).
24. See id. § 163-278.62(12). In North Carolina, the only statewide
[Vol. 2
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"certified," and thus eligible for public campaign funding.25  In
order to be certified by the State Board of Elections, candidates
must meet two basic requirements: (1) file a declaration of intent
to participate in the Act's funding scheme26 and (2) demonstrate
support of their candidacy by generating sufficient "qualifying
contributions."2 1 Once candidates are certified, they are provided
public funds for use in conducting their campaigns" and are bound
29by certain campaign contribution and expenditure restrictions.
Because certified candidates are restricted in the amount
they may spend during their campaign, the Act provides for the
disbursement of additional "rescue funds" to allow a candidate to
respond to attacks made by opposing candidates or independent
interest groups during the course of the campaign!' If a certified
candidate shows that funds in excess of the "rescue fund trigger"
amount have been spent in opposition to his candidacy, or in
support of an opponent, then the State Board of Elections is
required to issue to the attacked candidate additional funding equal
to the reported excess of the "rescue fund trigger."'" The "rescue
fund trigger" amount is roughly equal to the amount a candidate
may spend during the primary and general elections.32
judicial offices are those on the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.
25. See id. § 163-278.64.
26. Jd. § 163-278.64(a). In this declaration a candidate must affirm that
one political party will handle the candidate's "contributions, expenditures,
and obligations" and that the candidate will comply with specified
contribution and expenditure limits. Id.
27. Id. § 163-278.64(b). This "demonstration" must consist of qualifying
contributions (no less than $10, no more than $500) from at least 350
registered voters in an amount totaling thirty to sixty times the candidacy
filing fee (which fee is 1% of the annual salary of the office sought). Id.; see
also id. §§ 163-278.62(9)-.62(10), .62(15), 163-324.
28. See § 163-278.65(b)(4).
29. See id. § 163-278.64(d) (describing the contribution and expenditure
limits); § 163-278.65 (describing the amount of funding available to a
candidate).
30. See id. § 163-278.67.
31. See id.
32. See id. § 163-278.62(18). During a primary election, spending "in
opposition to" a certified candidate that exceeds the maximum amount of
"qualifying contributions" must be compensated with rescue funds. Id.
In plain English, the rescue funds provision works like this.
A certified candidate may not spend more than a specified amount
during a campaign. This causes a problem when a non-certified
candidate or an independent interest group attacks the certified
candidate. Because of the expenditure limitations, a certified
candidate would otherwise be unable to respond to the attacks-
expenditure limits tie a candidate's hands when attacked. The
rescue funds provision allows an attacked candidate to receive
additional funds necessary to combat the attacks-rescue funds
untie the candidate's hands.
Policy Arguments of The Statute
The rationale underlying the creation of the Act's public
financing scheme for judicial elections paralleled the traditional
justifications for campaign finance reform: campaign costs are
allegedly trending toward the exorbitant and threatening to
undermine equal participation in the democratic election process."
The escalating cost of elections will allegedly diminish access to
political power structures for those without sufficient wealth to
During a general election, spending "in opposition to" a certified candidate
that exceeds the maximum amount of "base level" funding must be
compensated with rescue funds. "Base level" funds are the public funds
available under the statute, and differ according to the office sought. See id. §
163-278.65(b)(4). Candidates for the Court of Appeals are given a base
funding of 125 times the amount of their filing fee (1% of the current salary of
a Court of Appeals judge). Id. Candidates for Supreme Court are given a base
funding of 175 times the amount of their filing fee (1 % of the current salary of
a Supreme Court justice). Id.
33. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 (1976) (citing the elimination of
improper influence of large private contributions as a goal of public campaign
financing); see, e.g., Richard Briffault, National Symposium on Judicial
Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment: Public Funds and the
Regulation of Judicial Campaigns, 35 Ind. L. Rev. 819, 819-23 (2002)
(discussing the need to reduce the potential influence of wealthy contributors
in judicial elections); Bradley A. Smith, Some Problems with Taxpayer-Funded
Political Campaigns, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 591 (1999) (noting the traditional
arguments in favor of campaign finance reform are unequal voter influence
over the political power structure and the possibility of corruption of political
officials by the need for large contributions).
[Vol. 2274 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
2004] RESCUE FUND TRIGGERS 275
participate and cause a perception of corruption in the political
process because candidates will be viewed as beholden to the34
interests of wealthy donors. These arguments were viewed as
especially applicable in the context of judicial elections in North
Carolina, where public opinion surveys indicated lagging public
confidence in fair and impartial judicial elections. Officially, the
policy purpose of the statute is
34. See, e.g., Christopher J. Ayers, Recent Development, Perry v.
Bartlett, A Preliminary Test for Campaign Finance Reform, 79 N.C. L. REV.
1788, 1794-98 (2001) (summarizing the two common arguments for campaign
finance reform as reduction of political corruption and providing opportunities
for equal access to the political process); Briffault, supra note 4, at 563-64
(arguing that the problems with the current system of campaign funding are
unequal access to political power structures and decreasing integrity of the
election system); Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 5, at 276-77 (1993) (arguing
that "poor or middle-class" citizens are denied equal access to the political
system by current campaign fundraising methods and thus have their
representation in democratic government diluted).
35. See Statewide Survey, supra note 13, at 1. Citing a study of North
Carolina voters by American Viewpoint, the North Carolina Center for Voter
Education noted the following:
The most disturbing result of the public opinion study is
that there is considerable cynicism about judicial
elections. More respondents (47%) believe that judicial
elections do not reflect the will of the average voter than
those who do believe (46%) that the outcome of such
races reflect the will of the average voter.... Of primary
concern to voters is the increasing role of money in
judicial elections. Eighty four percent (84%) of voters are
concerned that lawyers are some of the biggest campaign
contributors to judicial candidates, and 78% think that
campaign contributions influence judges' decision "a great
deal" or "some". Voters perceive the role of money not
just in terms of potential influence on judicial candidates,
but also as a barrier to electability: 85% are concerned
that because the cost of running for judge in North
Carolina can cost over one million dollars, some people
who would make good judges don't run for office. Fifty-
eight percent (58%) of those polled believe that [there]
are two systems of justice in North Carolina, one for the
rich and powerful and one for everyone else.
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to ensure the fairness of democratic elections in
North Carolina and to protect the
constitutional rights of voters and candidates
from the detrimental effects of increasingly
large amounts of money being raised and spent
to influence the outcome of elections, those
effects being especially problematic in elections
of the judiciary, since impartiality is uniquely
important to the integrity and credibility of the
courts.
The Act's rescue funds provision is related to these broader
policy objectives. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court upheld the
FECA's contribution limits and public campaign funding but struck
its expenditure limits as a violation of First Amendment speech
rights.37 In so doing, the Court distorted the original design of
campaign finance reform and instead " 'created a campaign finance
system very different from the one Congress intended.... In simple
economic terms, the Buckley Court limited supply (contributions),
while leaving demand (expenditures) free to grow without limit.' ""
Therefore, subsequent campaign finance reform schemes have
sought to limit expenditures without offending Buckley. 9 The
primary tool employed in this effort has been the creation of




37. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1976).
38. Kenneth N. Weine, supra note 12, at 226 (quoting BURT NEUBORNE,
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORMS & THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL LOOK AT
BUCKLEY V. VALEO (Brennan Center for Justice, Campaign Finance Reform
Series 1997)).
39. See id.; see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765,
768, 774-76 (2002) (holding unconstitutional a clause in the Minnesota canon
of judicial conduct prohibiting a judicial candidate from "announc[ing] his or
her views on disputed legal or political issues").
40. Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices,
205 F.3d 445, 466-68 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing the need to limit expenditures
through voluntary means or risk violating the First Amendment). Although
some have argued that the enticement tactics have crossed over into coercion,
they remain a primary tool of imposing expenditure limits without violating
[Vol. 2276
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Chief among these enticements is public campaign funding.4'
The problem, of course, is that candidates who accept the public
funding, and thereby agree to the expenditure limits, put• • 42
themselves in a precarious position. A publicly funded candidate
must agree to limit his or her spending, while a non-publicly funded
candidate has no such limit. The results are clear: "No candidate
will unilaterally disarm ... when faced with potentially unlimited
expenditures by opposing candidates or their allies.,
43
Rescue funds attempt to remedy this problem. They permit
a candidate to respond to attacks either by increasing the
candidate's spending limits or, as in North Carolina's Act, by
granting a direct public subsidy when opposing expenditures exceed
44those of the publicly funded candidate. Therefore, whenever a
non-participating candidate or private interest group attacks a
participating candidate, the non-participating party triggers a public
subsidy of the very message it seeks to oppose. While the policy
question of whether triggers are necessary to the success of
campaign reform may be debated in other circles, this paper
squarely addresses whether rescue fund triggers violate the First
Amendment rights of independent entities and non-publicly funded
candidates.
III. ANALYSIS
Three basic issues guide the inquiry into whether the Act's
rescue fund trigger is constitutional under the First Amendment:
(1) whether the trigger constitutes a burden on protected speech,
(2) whether the trigger constitutes a content-neutral or content-
based regulation, and (3) whether the asserted government interest
underlying the need to regulate speech and the means chosen to
the First Amendment. See id.
41. See id.
42. "[MJany candidates would decline voluntary limits because they are
afraid of not having the financial resources to respond to independent
spenders or opponents who do not voluntarily limit their spending." Weine,
supra note 12, at 226.
43. Id. at 223.
44. See id. at 228.
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regulate the speech at issue are sufficient to pass the constitutional• 4,5
test applied.
Burden on Protected Speech
The political speech at issue in the Act's rescue funds
provision has long been recognized as worthy of the highest
protection afforded under the Constitution. Courts and
commentators have affirmed with nearly one voice that political
speech holds an unrivaled status as the darling of the First
Amendment liberties.47 In its seminal ruling on restrictions relating
to speech in political campaigns, the Buckley Court advanced the
basic principle that "[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by our Constitution. The First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political
,,41expression ... , Commentators have since underlined the high
value placed on political speech. "In a nation where the people are
sovereign, it is absolutely essential that the citizenry is able to make
informed choices among the candidates for public office. 49
45. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493-502 (1985) (applying this basic framework
to political speech); see also Daggett, 205 F.3d passim (applying this
framework in assessing state public election financing schemes); Day v.
Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying this analytical framework
specifically to a rescue fund trigger provision).
46. The principle that political speech is protected in order "to assure
[the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people" has stood the test of time. Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); see also New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (supporting the United States's
constitutional commitment to public debate, which is "robust, uninhibited, and
wide-open").
47. " '1It can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee [of free
speech under the First Amendment] has its fullest and most urgent application
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.' " Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272
(1971)).
48. Id. at 14.
49. Id.
[Vol. 2278 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
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Especially relevant to the context of rescue fund triggers is
"issue advocacy" speech, a sub-category of political speech. In
Buckley, the Court drew a bright-line distinction between express
advocacy and issue advocacy. i Express advocacy may be regulated• 51
in certain instances; issue advocacy has absolute protection.
Speech deemed to be "express advocacy" is speech containing
terms that expressly "advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate for [political] office. ' ,52 Because the rescue
fund provision applies to any speech "in opposition to" a certified
candidate or "in support of" a certified candidate's opponent(s),
independent entities advocating on behalf of selected issues may
fall within the scope of the rescue funds provision if the issues they
advocate are the subject of an election debate.53 Thus, rescue fund
triggers apply to any speech made in opposition to issues which a
publicly funded candidate supports. In this respect, rescue fund
triggers come very close to the "bright line" between express
advocacy and issue advocacy, and thus venture into dangerous First
Amendment territory.
For the distinction between discussion of issues
and candidates and advocacy of election or
defeat of candidates may often dissolve in
50. Bungard, supra note 8, at 24.
51. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 6, at 836-37.
52. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44. Examples of express advocacy terms include:
"'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote
against,' 'defeat,' 'reject.' " Id. at 44 n.52.
53. Since the phrase "issue advocacy" appears nowhere in the language
of the Act (see especially sections 163-278.67(a)(2) and 163-278.66(a)), a
literal reading of the Act could suggest that issue advocacy by independent
entities would not trigger rescue funds. However, determining what is "in
opposition to" (the specific language used in the Act) was a subject of federal
litigation in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 108 F. Supp. 2d 498
(E.D.N.C. 2000). The overlap between issue advocacy and express advocacy
arises when a candidate is clearly identified with a particular issue. For
example, ads by the trial lawyers association stating "Tort Reform Is Bad for
America" could be interpreted as an attack on the reelection campaign of
George W. Bush. Likewise, ads by the American Medical Association stating
"Government Health Care Is A Step Toward Communism" could be
interpreted as a direct attack on a future campaign of Hillary Rodham
Clinton.
20041
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practical application. Candidates, especially
incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues
involving legislative proposals and
governmental actions. Not only do candidates
campaign on the basis of their positions on
various public issues, but campaigns themselves
generate issues of public interest.
At best, rescue fund triggers regulate political speech and• 55
may only be upheld in very limited circumstances. At worst, they
regulate issue advocacy speech and are subject to a near-absolute
bar.6
While the type of speech subject to the rescue fund trigger is
undoubtedly protected, the more complicated inquiry is whether
the trigger constitutes a burden on speech. This question has
provoked a hot and on-going debate. 7 The first appellate court to
analyze the constitutional validity of rescue fund triggers was the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Day v. Holahan." The
Minnesota statute at issue in Day provided that publicly financed
candidates for state office could have their expenditure limits
"increased by the sum of independent expenditures made in
opposition to a candidate plus independent expenditures made on
behalf of the candidate's major political party opponents ....
The statute also required that the government provide additional
funding to candidates "against whom the independent expenditures
have been made," in an amount equal to one-half of the adverse
independent expenditures.60 Thus, if an independent interest group
reached out to support a candidate, or a candidate's issues, then its
54. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
55. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 6, at 836-37.
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., Weine, supra note 12, passim (discussing the history of
trigger litigation and arguing for upholding their constitutionality).
58. 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994).
59. Id. at 1359. The statute excluded from this sum the amount of
expenditures made "by an association targeted to inform solely its own dues-
paying members of the association's position on a candidate." Id.
60. Id. The conditions a candidate was required to meet included having
eligibility to receive a public subsidy and raising twice the minimum match. Id.
[Vol. 2280
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expression of support triggered increased spending limits for the
candidate who was deemed to be "attacked," and supplied that
candidate with a public subsidy equal to one-half the amount spent
61
by the independent group.
In analyzing whether this reimbursement scheme burdened
speech, the court first determined that the speech at issue was
protected under the First Amendment.6 2 It next addressed the crux
of the inquiry: the extent of the burden. Here, the court noted that
because the statute required public compensation to an attacked
candidate, independent groups that advocated against the election
of a candidate, or against an issue supported by that candidate,
were made directly responsible for adding to the campaign coffers
of the candidate they opposed. 6' The court held that the statute
caused independent groups to self-censor their advocacy of a
candidate or a candidate's issues, and thus created an impermissible
chilling effect on speech.TM
Several additional cases support the Eighth Circuit's
conclusion that funding triggers impermissibly burden speech.
These arguments fall mainly under the Court's "compelled speech"
jurisprudence. Through Justice Jackson's well-known opinion in
65West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court
articulated the broad principle that government may not compel
61. See Adam S. Tanenbaum, Day v. Holahan: Crossroads In Campaign
Finance Jurisprudence, 84 GEo. L. J. 151, passim (1995) (making the argument
that the "limit increase" provision of Minnesota's law ought to have been
treated separately from the "public subsidy" provision).
62. Day, 34 F.3d at 1360.
63. See id. at 1360.
64. Id. Some commentators have rightly observed that the "chilling
effect" discussed in Day was an inappropriately chosen doctrine. See
Tanenbaum, supra note 61, at 161-64. Chilling effects are normally invoked in
cases of overbreadth or vagueness-when a lack of precision in a statute leads
a speaker to fear punishment and thus urges him to silence. See Smolla, supra
note 1, § 3.03[2], at 3-97; see also Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S.
781, 793-95 (1988); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967)
(noting the dangers of chilling effects on free speech which result from
imprecise or unclear regulatory language).
65. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
2004]
any person to support, by word or act, a message or belief.66 There,
the Court specifically and expressly refused to endorse the notion
that "a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak
his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to
utter what is not in his mind., 67 The Court went one step further in
Wooley v. Maynardr where it held that the First Amendment
protected both "the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all .... .The right to speak and the right to refrain
from speaking are complementary components of the broader
concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' 
,,69
Rescue fund triggers, when analyzed as compelled speech,
raise significant constitutional problems. When the trigger applies,
an independent interest group is compelled to facilitate the
expression of a message with which it necessarily disagrees-the
attacking party creates increased expenditure limits and additional
public subsidies employed to convey the very message an attacking
speaker sought to avoid. 70  This outcome violates precedent
indicating the First Amendment prohibits the government from
requiring a speaker to facilitate directly the communication of a
message it did not choose." Quite simply, by forcing an
66. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein.'" Id. at 642.
67. Id. at 634; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415 (1989)
(reaffirming the principle that government may not compel speech).
68. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
69. Id. at 714.
70. Perhaps this situation is distinguishable on the ground that the
speaker is not itself being compelled to speak, that is, the candidate is
speaking, not the independent interest group. The Court, however, has
dismissed such distinctions in the past, even where the authorship of a message
was clear. In Tornillo and Pacific Gas, the Court invalidated regulations
which required speakers to facilitate the expression of opposing messages,
even though the opposing speaker was clearly identified and distinct from the
facilitating speaker. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S.
1 (1986); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
71. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 418 U.S. at 258 (invalidating as
unconstitutional a requirement that newspapers must provide
counterargument space for political candidates who had been attacked in
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independent interest group to play an instigating and supporting
role in conveying an opposing message, rescue fund triggers are
antagonistic to the "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open ....
Not all courts have agreed with this line of analysis.73 In
Daggett, the First Circuit grappled with a rescue fund provision
similar to the one at issue in Day, but found it to be constitutional.
There, the plaintiff challenged the Maine Clean Election Act (the
Maine Act), which bestowed a publicly financed campaign fund
upon candidates who agreed to abide by certain First Amendment
limitations on their campaign activities.75 One provision of the
Maine Act granted a candidate attacked by an independent entity a
dollar-for-dollar matching public subsidy, up to double the original• 76
campaign disbursement. The plaintiffs relied heavily on Day in
arguing the case, but the Daggett court broke new analytical
ground. The court found that the rescue fund provision did not
burden speech because the First Amendment granted no right to
print, even though the opposing message was identified as directly attributable
to its author); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 20-21 (invalidating as
unconstitutional a requirement that public utility companies must provide
counterargument space for opposing messages within their billing envelopes,
even though the author of the opposing message was clearly identified). But
see Pruneyard Shopping Cir. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding a
requirement for a shopping mall to allow protestors to speak on private
property because the message could not be attributed to the owner). Even
though the speakers in these cases were forced to allow opposing speech on
private property, the governing principle emphasized by the Court in Pacific
Gas was whether the speaker evidenced a particular objection to the message
being conveyed. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 2-12.
72. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
73. See Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election
Practices, 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000); cf. Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d
1544 (8th Cir. 1996); Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995)
(upholding rescue fund triggers, but only in the case of spending by candidates
who chose not to participate in public funding).
74. See Daggett, 205 F.3d at 463-65.
75. Id. at 450-52.
76. Id. at 451.
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speak free from response. 7 "We cannot adopt the logic of Day,
which equates responsive speech with an impairment to the initial
speaker."
78
In upholding the Maine Act, the First Circuit relied on
language in Buckley that asserted an underlying purpose of the
First Amendment is to "secure the 'widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources.' "" The Maine
Act's consistency with this goal was sufficient to deem non-
burdensome any so-called restriction on speech. s  At least one
commentator agreed with Daggett's rationale, arguing that rescue
fund triggers enhance speech rather than chill it.8' In noting several
ways in which reformers can reach the result of characterizing
rescue fund triggers as constitutional, Weiner stated, "The First
Amendment is concerned with persecution, not reprisal. That is, it
protects individuals from being persecuted-or chilled from
speaking. Its purpose is not to inhibit individuals from responding
to speech. '"&3
These arguments, however, fail to note two considerations.
First, the question of whether government encourages more speech
through a given regulation is not the true issue; the issue is whether
the government is encouraging more (or less) speech by compelling
a specific speaker to facilitate a message not of its choosing.8 In
this sense, Daggett fails to address the most debilitating arguments
against its holding. The second consideration unaddressed by the
Daggett court is that the First Amendment is not limited to the
narrow goal of generating more speech from more persons. It also
has the equally strong (if not stronger) purposes of promoting
77. Id. at 464. "The public funding system in no way limits the quantity
of speech one can engage in or the amount of money one can spend engaging
in political speech...." Id.
78. Id. at 465.
79. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49.
80. See Daggett, 205 F.3d at 463-65.
81. See Weine, supra note 12, at 233.
82. See id. at 232.
83. Id. at 233. The Daggett court also stated, "We cannot adopt the logic
of Day, which equates responsive speech with an impairment to the initial
speaker." Id.
84. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
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individual autonomy and democratic freedom." These purposes
are not necessarily served merely by increasing the amount or
diversity of speech. As the District Court in Day noted, the First
Amendment seeks to promote and protect "free and open
debate. , 6 Where a regulation erects an impediment to free and
open debate in the political realm, or promotes an interest other
than the unrestrained participation (or non-participation) of
individuals "in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion, that regulation undercuts personal liberty, is
antithetical to a tolerant democracy,89  and places an
unconstitutional burden on speech.90
Content Neutrality
A secondary issue in rescue fund trigger cases is whether the
alleged restriction on political speech is content-neutral or content-
based. If the trigger is found to be a content-neutral time, place, or
85. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978) (contending that speech is
protected because of the value of speech to individuals); Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 523, 527
(1977) (suggesting that the function of free speech is to preserve democracy);
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877 (1963) (citing as rationales for the First Amendment, inter alia,
the value of individual self-fulfillment and self-governance through open
discussion); Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591
(1982) (noting the self-realization benefits of the First Amendment).
86. Day v. Hayes, 863 F. Supp. 940, 947 (D. Minn. 1994). It should be
noted that the district court cited this principle as one of several in support of
upholding the rescue trigger. But the principle plays a much larger role-
stimulating free and open debate is a primary purpose of the First
Amendment.
87. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
88. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
12 (1989) (noting that voluntary speech is essential for self-definition and self-
expression).
89. See LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA § 9, at 9-10 (1986) (noting that
free speech promotes self-restraint in an effort to allow individuals to express
their opinions and feelings).
90. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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manner restriction, it will face the intermediate scrutiny of United
States v. O'Brien.9'  If the trigger is content-based, it will be
presumptively invalid and must clear the high hurdle of strict• 92
scrutiny. Resolving the issue of content neutrality is decisive. 9
A content-based regulation is a regulation which "restrict[s]
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its
content."94 In other words, a content-based regulation penalizes
speech on the basis of its viewpoint or subject matter." Because the
Daggett court did not find the rescue fund trigger to be a burden on
speech, it did not reach the issue of content neutrality.
Nevertheless, a cogent argument can be advanced in support of
content-neutrality.
Rescue fund triggers generally apply equally to all speakers.
Regardless of the viewpoint or content of the independent entity's
message, an attacked candidate is eligible for an increase in
spending authorization or public subsidy. In discerning the content-
neutrality of such circumstances, the Court's "secondary effects"
analysis advanced in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters16 is
especially helpful. In Renton, a city ordinance singled out adult
theaters by requiring that they be allowed to operate only in certain
districts separated from residential areas.7 The ordinance clearly
targeted the theatres because of their sexual subject matter, but the
Court ruled that the restriction was not content-based. Rather, the
Court held that the ordinance was targeted to control the
91. See 391 U.S. 367 (1968). A content-neutral restriction will be upheld
if "it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the restriction of
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest." id. at 377; see also Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (modifying the intermediate scrutiny analysis of
O'Brien).
92. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
93. See generallY Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 46 (1987) (discussing the nuances of regulation of speech content).
94. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
95. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983).
96. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
97. Id. at 46-49.
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"secondary effects" of adult theaters on the surrounding
community (e.g. crime).' In the case of rescue fund triggers, it can
be argued that the speech of independent interest groups is
restricted because of its harmful secondary effects on attacked
candidates (that is, undermining the integrity of the campaign
reform statute). Thus, one possible conclusion is that the rescue
fund triggers operate as content-neutral restrictions and should be
permissible under Renton.
The Day court came to the opposite conclusion, finding that
the rescue fund trigger restricted speech based on its election-
oriented subject matter. A consistent line of cases supports this
conclusion. In Carey v. Brown, a city ordinance prohibited labor
picketing in residential neighborhoods. The Court found this
regulation to be content-based, even though it did not discriminate
between viewpoints, because the restriction prohibited labor-
oriented speech and no other... Similarly, Burson v. Freeman"t1
held that a restriction on all political campaigning (by any
candidate) within 100 feet of an election polling site was a content-
based restriction because it regulated only political speech. 02
The subject matter restriction in Burson is closely analogous
to restrictions imposed by rescue fund triggers-rescue fund
triggers regulate only political speech. As the Court announced in
Burson:
Whether individuals may exercise their free
speech rights near polling places depends
entirely on whether their speech is related to a
political campaign. The statute does not reach
other categories of speech .... This Court has
held that the First Amendment's hostility to
content-based regulation extends not only to a
restriction on a particular viewpoint, but also to
98. Id. at 47.
99. 447 U.S. 455 (1988).
100. See id. at 462.
101. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
102. Id. at 197. The Court, however, upheld the restriction because the
protection of the fundamental right to cast a ballot free from the reach of
intimidation was deemed a compelling interest. Id. at 198-99.
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a prohibition of public discussion of an entire
topic.)
°
Although the restriction in Burson applied equally to all
speakers within one hundred feet of a polling site, the restriction
operated as a bar only to political speech and was thus held to be
content-based. The speech restrictions imposed by rescue fund
triggers, although evenly applied, necessarily target political speech.
They are therefore likely to be deemed content-based and subject
to strict scrutiny.) 4
The Nature of The State Interest
A third and final issue in the rescue fund trigger debate is
the nature of the asserted state interest and the means chosen to
accomplish that interest. Because strict scrutiny is likely to apply,
the state interest supporting rescue funds must be deemed
compelling and the means chosen to achieve it must be narrowly
tailored for the provision to survive constitutional scrutiny.
Cogent arguments have been advanced on both sides of the issue.
The Day court held that the rescue fund provision did not
stand up to strict scrutiny.' 6 The interest asserted by the state there
was " 'enhancing the public's confidence in the political process by
ensuring the viability of the legislature's statutory scheme designed
to encourage candidates to accept the voluntary campaign
expenditures ... and the accompanying public subsidies.' ,107 The
court noted that the rate of voluntary participation in the publicly
funded election scheme was at ninety-seven percent before
enactment of the statute. On this basis, Day held that the
asserted interest supporting the rescue fund trigger was not
103. Id. at 197.
104. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (requiring content-based
restrictions to be struck unless the restriction is narrowly tailored to support a
compelling state interest).
105. See id.
106. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1361-62 (1994).
107. Id. at 1361 (citations omitted).
108. See id. In the years prior, the level of voluntary participation was
similarly high, at eighty-nine percent in 1988 and ninety-six percent in 1990. Id.
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sufficiently compelling to justify upholding the statute. "Clearly,
the campaign reform legislation was not necessary to encourage
candidates' involvement in public campaign financing ...,, The
court found that the means were not narrowly tailored for a similar
reason: "it occurs to us that no statute that infringes on First
Amendment rights can be considered 'narrowly tailored' to meet
the state's purported interest" in circumstances where that interest
is adequately achieved without the statute.0
Critics have charged the Day court with misconstruing the
state interest underlying rescue fund triggers."' They argue the
interest advanced by rescue fund triggers is not to encourage
participation in a publicly funded campaign financing scheme, but
generally to preserve the integrity of the election process and to
encourage greater political debate in the marketplace of ideas than
there is at present due to the overbearing influence of wealthy
candidates."' In this light, rescue fund triggers are viewed as nearly
identical to the public financing scheme upheld in Buckley."3 The
broad public financing statute in Buckley was upheld because it
attempted to provide candidates with an amount of funding
sufficient to remain competitive against non-publicly funded
candidates, and rescue fund triggers are purported to accomplish
the same objective.' 4 The only difference is timing-the Buckley
109. Id. The court also noted that with participation rates at nearly one
hundred percent without the current restrictions, -[o]ne hardly could be
faulted for concluding that this 'compelling' state interest was contrived for
purposes of this litigation." Id.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Tanenbaum, supra note 61, at 151 (attacking the Day
decision).
112. Id. Other decisions of the Court have also recognized that wealth
can lead to distortion of political debate and a skewing of the marketplace of
ideas. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659
(1990) (citing the prevention of political corruption as compelling state
interest); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
257 (1986) (citing need to protect the marketplace of ideas); Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97
(1985) (citing prevention of political corruption as a compelling state interest).
113. See Weine, supra note 12, at 235-36.
114. See id. at 236.
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system offers competitive funding at the beginning of the campaign,
a rescue fund trigger offers competitive funding as the campaign
progresses. Thus, rescue fund triggers are reputed to protect the
same interests of open debate and political non-corruption as
Buckley.
The underlying goal of the Minnesota
Legislature [in enacting the rescue fund trigger]
appeared to be aimed at balancing
constitutional regulation of campaign financing
with maintenance of a fair political process and
open debate. By implementing the limit
increase provision, the Minnesota Legislature
attempted to avert the unintended
consequences of voluntary spending limits-a
candidate being restrained from responding to
unforeseen expenditures made against him,
causing an unfair advantage to accrue to his
opponents. 16
With these compelling interests in place, allowing publicly
funded candidates to respond to attacks is asserted to be a narrowly
tailored interest. The rescue fund trigger remedies exactly the
targeted ill-allowing an attacked candidate to defend himself or
herself during the course of an election.'
1 7
The Day Court did not fully address this argument. Instead,
it leaned heavily on the high percentage of current participation in
the public funding program as support both for the illegitimacy of
the state interest and the means employed to achieve it."' The Day
court may have been correct in asserting that the "independent
expenditure" portion of the statute was aimed at encouraging
candidates to accept the voluntary campaign expenditures.'1 Yet,
even if the state interest could legitimately have been characterized
as protecting against political corruption, there remain analytical
115. See id.
116. Tanenbaum, supra note 61, at 171.
117. See id. at 174-75.
118. See Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1361-63 (1994).
119. See id. at 1361.
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problems in the means chosen to achieve this end.
As a starting point, it must be recognized that because
publicly funded campaign financing systems burden the speech
rights of candidates, the state may not compel participation in a
campaign financing program which violates the speech rights of its
citizens.2 "Congress may engage in public financing of election
campaigns and may condition acceptance of public funds on an
agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure
limitations." Therefore, campaign finance reformers seek to
122encourage voluntary participation in public financing programs.
And herein lies the problem. Even where the state interest
advanced is "protection against corruption in the political process,"
that is not the specific evil targeted narrowly by a rescue fund
trigger. Rather, a rescue fund trigger is intended to make the public
financing scheme sufficiently attractive to encourage voluntary
participation by candidates. ' Thus, the State's interest is limiting
120. See Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp
280, 284 (S.D.N.Y.), affd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980). "[Als long as the
candidate remains free to engage in unlimited private funding and spending
instead of limited public funding, the law does not violate the First
Amendment rights of the candidate or supporters." Id.; see also Daggett v.
Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 467 (1st
Cir. 2000) ("[G]overnment may create incentives for candidates to participate
in a public funding system in exchange for their agreement not to rely on
private contributions" (citations omitted)); Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4
F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 1993) ( "[V]oluntariness has proven to be an important
factor in judicial ratification of government-sponsored campaign financing
schemes.").
121. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976) (emphasis added).
122. See Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 38.
123. See Weine, supra note 12, at 226.
Unlike campaign systems with mandatory spending
limits-where candidates have no choice as to whether or
not to limit their spending-systems with voluntary limits
will only have a significant equalizing impact if most
candidates accept these limits. Accordingly, reformers
have sought to identify and accommodate concerns of
candidates that might deter them from accepting
voluntary spending limits.
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speech rights, and a rescue fund trigger is carefully crafted to
achieve that interest. In one breath, the State has built a
"voluntary" corral, into which candidates may be herded by a
"compelling state interest." One candidate is enticed to give up his
or her free speech rights so long as the speech rights of another
candidate can be burdened, and the ironic justification offered is
that such a policy increases "free and open debate."'24
We are left with an analytical knot. If the State's interest is
specifically defined as "participation in the statutory program," that
interest is manifestly not compelling. If the State's interest is
defined as "protection against corruption of the political process,"
the means are not narrowly tailored. Either way, the rescue fund
trigger cannot escape the net of strict scrutiny.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rescue fund triggers such as the one enacted by North
Carolina's Judicial Campaign Reform Act provide an enticement to
participate in publicly funded elections. Would-be candidates who
fear having their hands tied in the course of their campaign by
outside attacks must be free to respond to those attacks. Toward
this end, rescue fund triggers have legitimate reasons for their
existence.
The problem, however, is that despite the legitimacy of the
underlying policies, rescue fund triggers infringe on the liberties
guaranteed to all citizens under the First Amendment. Political
speech holds an exalted place under the First Amendment. If
possible, issue advocacy speech holds a place even higher. By
forcing independent interest groups, whose purpose for existence is
to advocate or attack issues of their choosing, to become the sole
instrument of facilitating a message they oppose, North Carolina
has unconstitutionally burdened the speech of those entities.
124. In upholding the rescue fund trigger, the district court decision in
Day stated, "To the extent the statute provides for increased debate about
issues of public concern raised by an independent expenditure, it promotes the
free and open debate the First Amendment seeks to foster and protect." Day
v. Hayes, 863 F. Supp. 940, 947 (D. Minn. 1994).
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Whether North Carolina's rescue fund trigger is an integral
and necessary part of the greater campaign financing reform
machine is not the relevant constitutional question. Neither is
asking whether the regulation creates more speech. The decisive
inquiry is this: whether compelling one entity to become the
facilitator of a message it necessarily opposes is First Amendment
anathema. To that question, the policies, purposes, and precedents
of the First Amendment answer yes with one accord.
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